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Abstract 
According to economic theory, elderly homeowners should be much more eager than they 
actually are to adopt financial instruments allowing them to borrow against home equity. 
This paper investigates the determinants of interest in one such instrument: the reverse 
mortgage. Our focus is the Italian market and we draw from a unique dataset, 
UniCredit’s 2007 survey on household savings to perform our empirical analysis. Out of 
over 1,200 respondents, roughly 60% claimed to have no interest in the product, while 
the remaining 40% expressed various degrees of appeal, from quite low to very high. 
Risk/uncertainty related elements are strongly correlated with interest in the product. 
Willingness to sell one’s home (as a means to increase future income) and uncertainty 
about post-retirement standard of living are significant predictors of high interest in the 
product, while an aversion to take on debt and a larger housing equity predict a lack of 
interest. This results suggest that reverse mortgages are not perceived as instruments to 
accomplish a better standard of living in old age, but rather as a last resort choice in 
case of necessity.  
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1. Introduction 
As western societies experienced unprecedented population ageing, the saving 
behaviour of the elderly and their portfolio holdings has become central to 
the policy debate; dependency ratios will rise dramatically over the next 30 
years, especially for Italy, France, Germany and Japan where they are 
projected to exceed 45 percent by 2050 (Mitchell and Piggott, 2003). The 
effects of the demographic trends are massive, even more so in countries 
where the elderly are heavily dependent on publicly provided income and 
benefit programs. Unless the elderly are able to finance a consistent share of 
their expenditure through accumulated assets, the sustainability of national 
welfare systems will be undermined, and because real rather than financial 
assets are predominant in households’ portfolios, the availability of financial 
instruments designed to help decumulate illiquid assets is crucial. Among 
such instruments, reverse mortgage loans (RMs) stand out because they 
allow better consumption smoothing in old age. At the same time, by 
encouraging the direct participation of the elderly in financing their 
retirement needs, RMs could ease the burden of ageing on public budgets. 
Despite their welfare-improving potential, RMs have received only limited 
acceptance (Caplin 2001) and many explanations have arisen to explain it. 
First of all, it is not just illiquid assets, but all assets that elderly households 
seem reluctant to shed. While according to Modigliani and Bruemberg’s 
(1954) lifecycle hypothesis, individuals smooth their lifetime consumption by 
borrowing when ‘young’, saving when ‘middle aged’, and dissaving when 
‘old’, empirically the rate of wealth decumulation appears slower than the 
model predicts (Venti and Wise 1987; Ando et al.1993; Chiuri and Jappelli 
2007; Angelini and Laferrère 2010), with precautionary savings motivated by 
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expected health and care expenditures (Carroll et al. 1992) and bequest 
motives (Kotlikoff and Summers 1981) or a combination of both (Skinner and 
Zeldes, 2002) explaining discrepancies between facts and theory.  
The portfolio composition of the elderly, which generally favours illiquid 
assets such as housing (Mitchell and Piggott 2003), can be a further 
disincentive to asset depletion. Housing equity can be liquidated by selling 
one’s home and renting, or moving to a smaller dwelling (downsizing), 
however, this involves both financial and psychological transaction costs 
(Leviton 2002), so the elderly may prefer to settle for lower consumption 
levels. RMs represent a feasible solution to eschew undesired consumption 
drops when old. 
Because of its swift population ageing and high homeownership rates (78% 
among the elderly), Italy is an interesting case for studying households’ 
attitudes toward RMs. Drawing on a unique dataset, the 2007 UniCredit 
Survey (UCS), in which over 1,200 respondents indicated their interest in 
taking out such a loan (with 40% expressing various degrees of appeal), we 
investigate the underlying factors determining interest in the product with 
the use of a discrete choice model. We find that risk/uncertainty-related 
elements are significantly correlated with interest in the product, while the 
bequest motive, proxied by having children in the household, does not 
preclude interest in the product 1 . Respondents who have negative 
expectations on public pensions, that is express concern about their standard 
of living after retirement, are significantly more likely to be interested. 
Finally, higher levels of financial literacy appear to have a negative effect, 
but the results are barely significant.  
                                                          
 
1 RMs can be used to give financial help children and grandchildren while one is still alive. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the 
main features of RMs. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
calculates the net worth of RMs and provides clues on their potential market 
size. Section 4 introduces the data sources and explains how the main 
indicators are constructed. Section 5 describes the econometric model and 
presents the estimated results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. RMs: An overview 
RMs are innovative financial products because they allow elderly 
homeowners to consume (part of) their housing equity without having to 
disrupt housing arrangements, and without any obligation of repayment until 
the borrower dies, moves out, or sells the house (Eschtruth and Tran 2001). 
They differ from home reversion programs (such as the sale of bare 
ownership) in that the property rights over the house remain with the 
borrower, while with home reversion programs the property rights are 
transferred onto the lender, the borrower only retaining the right to live in 
the estate until death (usufruct)2.  
The loan can be paid out as a lump sum, through fixed monthly payments 
(term, tenure plan or life annuity), as a line of credit, or as a combination of 
term / tenure plan and line of credit (Rodda et al.). 
The amount of the loan depends positively on the age of the (youngest in 
a couple) borrower and the value of the property and negatively on the 
interest rate. The outstanding balance of the loan grows over time, as the 
interest is capitalised, but no payment is due until the borrower (or spouse) 
                                                          
 
2 The difference is about who benefits from a housing market upturn: by entering a home reversion scheme, the 
borrower gives up any claim on future house value appreciation; conversely, by taking out a reverse mortgage, any 
appreciation of the value of the house will benefit the borrower or the borrower’s heirs. 
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dies, moves out, or sells the house. When any of these events occurs, the loan 
must be repaid in full – in one solution within the subsequent 10 to 12 
months – and with any available source of funds, including proceeds from the 
sale of the house (Eschtruth and Tran 2001); thus borrowers (or their heirs) 
have the choice to either pay back the loan and keep the house, or sell the 
house to repay the loan and cash the difference (if any). RMs provide a series 
of safeguards and advantages for the borrowers and their heirs: should the 
amount withdrawn exceed the value of the house once it’s sold, borrowers (or 
their heirs) do not have to pay the difference (Rodda et al.). 
Despite these attractive features, RMs have not (yet?) gained the favour 
of elderly homeowners. Introduced by US Congress in 1987 explicitly to 
facilitate the financing of consumption in old age (Rodda et al. 2000), Home 
Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs) are still rather uncommon, even in 
the US, since not even 1% of possible beneficiaries has entered an equity 
release scheme (Caplin 2001). The trend, however, seems to have changed in 
recent years (at least up to the 2008 financial crisis), the market size of 
HECMs more than decoupling: Shan’s (2009) report to the US Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors shows that the number of RM loans escalated 
from less than 10,000 in 2001 to over 100,000 in 2007 and mentions rising 
home values, lower interest rates, and increasing awareness of the product as 
plausible explanatory factors (we do not have evidence following the bursting 
of the housing bubble). 
The European Union (EU) RM market is not only very thin, but also 
unevenly developed across countries with regards to volume of production, 
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lending methods, and diversity of products.3 Most equity release schemes in 
the EU share common criteria, in terms of minimum age requirements and 
minimum property value (which must be free from other debt), and involve a 
series of protections for borrowers, as well as the obligation to carry out 
repairs and maintenance. Borrowers are protected from declining home prices 
because the value of the loan cannot exceed the value of the house (no 
negative equity guarantee); conversely, if the house is sold for more than the 
loan is worth, the excess equity belongs to the heirs. 
As many as 13 EU countries have at least one institution supplying some 
form of equity release product4, with Ireland, Spain, and the UK totalling the 
highest numbers of providers. The estimated number of equity release 
contracts sold in 2007 in the UK was 33,000, versus 3,600 in Spain, 2,500 in 
Sweden, 300 in Italy, 200 in France, and 100 in Germany5 (data for Ireland 
were not available). The UK has a long history of home reversion plans, 
dating as far back as 19656; however, according to a report from the Council 
of Mortgage Lenders (CML), despite a recent upward trend, the market has 
remained substantially underdeveloped and stagnant (Williams, 2008). The 
CML report suggests that negative reputation of earlier generation equity 
release products and perceived excessive costs are the main reasons for the 
underdevelopment of their market. Indeed, as the housing price appreciation 
of the 1980s failed to match the accrued interest on mortgages, borrowers 
                                                          
 
3 According to the Study on Equity Release Schemes in the EU, commissioned by the EU and carried out by the 
Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen (IFF) in 2007 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-
retail/docs/credit/equity_release_part1_en.pdf), approximately 45,000 lifetime/reverse mortgages contracts were 
signed in the EU in 2007, for an estimated value of €3.3 billion, less than 0.1% of the overall mortgage market.  
4 Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
5 Data from the Study on Equity Release Schemes, 2007, and responses from providers and regulators, with IFF 
calculations. 
6 The first reversion income scheme was introduced by Home Reversions in 1965; the first home income plan based 
on a mortgage and annuity was issued in 1972. Cash reversion plans were introduced in 1978 by JG Inskip & Co. 
(Joseph Rountree Foundation 2003). 
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found themselves owing more than their property was worth and this raised 
the concern for a no negative equity guarantee. 
In Italy, the product was formally introduced in 2005 under the name 
prestito vitalizio ipotecario available to homeowners over 65 whose housing 
equity exceeds €70,000. So far, only a few credit institutions offer home 
equity conversion products: Deutsche Bank’s PatrimonioCasa7 and Euvis’s 
Prestito Vitalizio are available only as a lump sum, while Banca Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena offers PrestiSenior8 to those over 70 as either a lump sum or 
an annuity for a maximum of 20 years. 
According to Case and Schnare (1994), interest in RMs should be strong 
among the ‘house-rich, cash-poor’ (pp. 301) elderly homeowners, and, since 
such description fits more than 3 million Americans, they estimate a large 
potential market. Mayer and Simons (1993) also note the high poverty 
alleviating potential of RMs, since many elderly could use them to pay off 
pre-existing debts. Ong (2008) estimates that RMs could lift out of poverty 
95% of income-poor elderly Australians, and identifies single women aged 80 
and over as the segment of the population that would benefit the most. 
Conversely, empirical studies carried out in the US (Venti and Wise, 1987) 
and the UK (Hancook, 1998) see a more limited scope for RMs, claiming that 
low-income elderly generally have little, if any, housing equity available. 
Caplin (2001) suggests that, even with the most pessimistic assessments, the 
RMs market should be much larger than it is, and highlights transactions 
costs, moral hazard, and uncertainty about future needs and preferences as 
the main economic forces that hinder its development. Mitchell and Piggott 
                                                          
 
7 Deutsche Bank (2010), informational pamphlet for the prestito vitalizio ipotecario PatrimonioCasa contract. 
8 Montepaschi, informational pamphlet for the prestito vitalizio ipotecario PrestiSenior, April 2011. 
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(2003) suggest that before a RMs market can established (in Japan), 
governments need to address relatively underdeveloped financial markets and 
regulatory infrastructure. 
To explain why the market is so thin, other researchers focus on the high 
costs of RMs. For example, the possibility of moral hazard in the case of 
meagre home maintenance by homeowners intending to default on their 
contract obligations9 (Caplin 2000) and the adverse selection of longer-lived 
mortgagors10 (Davidoff and Welke 2005) can translate into high insurance 
fees and make the product rather expensive. Leviton (2002) also mentions 
that taking out a RM conflicted with the desire to leave a legacy, however, 
other studies reported that many elderly would use the RM annuity to help 
their children (Rodda et al. 2000).   
Gibler and Rabianski (1993) mention debt aversion among the elderly as a 
barrier to the uptake of RMs. The authors report that older consumers 
generally dislike buying on credit and would rather live on less income than 
take out a loan. Caplin (2000) also suggests that households may prefer a 
lower level of consumption in a debt-free house to a higher level in a debt-
ridden one, relating the presence of debt with an increase in uncertainty. 
Finally, Shan (2009) indicates that an increased tendency to take on debt 
over the past few years can explain part of the substantial growth of the US 
RM market.  
                                                          
 
9 Caplin (2000) emphasises moral hazard in home maintenance and argues that, since typical RM borrowers are very 
old, very poor, and likely to suffer from health problems, they are also more likely to let their properties deteriorate, 
and thus the legal provisions protecting the lender may not be enforced. The author advocates a rationalisation of 
the regulatory system as a means of fostering financial innovation in general and promoting RMs in particular. 
10 Davidoff and Welke (2005) investigate adverse selection by comparing the mobility rates between RM borrowers 
and non- borrowers. Interestingly, the authors reveal advantageous selection, since homeowners who take out RMs 
are also more likely to sell their homes and therefore repay their loans earlier. 
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Another possible explanation for the limited interest in RMs may be 
financial illiteracy. 11  Gibler and Rabiansky (1993) differentiate between 
financially sophisticated homeowners, who may see RMs as part of an 
investment portfolio decision, and financially unsophisticated ones, who are 
less likely to be interested in a product that is both unknown and complex. 
Leviton (2002), for example, explains how, because of poor financial 
education, many elderly homeowners overestimated the net worth of their 
RMs and felt disappointed when given the real figures by mortgage 
counsellors. Reed (2009) finds that, among Australian homeowners who 
claimed to be aware of RMs, only 40% understood the basic features, 
specifically, that no repayments were due and that the house would not be 
sold. Duca and Kumar (2010) also report a positive correlation between 
households with mortgage equity withdrawals and lack of financial literacy. 
Finally, Fornero and Monticone (2011) relate financial literacy with effective 
retirement planning and report that most Italians lack knowledge of basic 
financial concepts. It is also worth noting that the US law establishes that 
borrowers obtain financial counselling before they can apply for a HECM 
loan (Rodda et al. 2000), while, to our knowledge, this is not yet the case in 
Europe.   
3. Estimating the monetary value of RMs 
Our analysis cannot directly estimate the impact of RMs uptake on the 
welfare of the elderly, as we do not have the relevant data; we can, however, 
calculate RMs money’s worth and appraise the potential benefits as a 
                                                          
 
11 Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) define financial literacy as a set of tools enabling one to better allocate financial 
resources; it is often associated with numerical skills, such as the ability to calculate rates of return on investments 
and the interest rate on debt, or understanding economic concepts such as the trade-off between risk and return, the 
benefits of diversification, and the benefits and risks associated with specific financial decisions. 
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percentage increase in income for given demographics and housing equity 
levels in the UCS. 
We adopt the sinking fund formula used in Ong (2008), based on the 
Evaluation Report of FHA’s12 Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Insurance 
Demonstration by Rodda et al. (2000). The formula yields the payments 
generated by RMs for a given housing equity level, interest rate, and life 
expectancy. 
Payments to borrowers are calculated according to the principal limit 
factor,13 the age (or life expectancy) of the (youngest, in a couple) borrower, 
the mortgage interest rate, and the adjusted property value. As for our 
calculations (reported in Table 2), the principal limit factor in Italy ranges 
from roughly 20% of the housing equity for 65-years-olds to roughly 50% for 
those over 9014; the borrower’s life expectancy (in months) is set at 100 minus 
the current age, multiplied by 12 (Rodda et al. 2000); the interest rate is set 
at 6.8% per annum (0.55% per month), an average of the Deutsche Bank 
(7.3%),15 Monte dei Paschi di Siena (7.9%), and the Housing and Urban 
Development’s HECM (5.5%) RM rates; the average housing equity is 
calculated from our sample homeowners. 
The yearly payment to the borrower under the tenure plan can be 
computed as an annuity, using the formula 
)1()1( 1 rr
rHA
iei +−+
=
+  
 
                                                          
 
12 Federal housing association.  
13 The principal limit is computed so that the expected mortgage insurance losses over the life of the loan are no 
greater than the expected premium collected. The higher the expected interest rates, the lower the principal limit 
factor: Higher expected interest rates mean higher future loan balances, which would result in larger insurance losses 
unless the amount of principal advanced were reduced. 
14 The values reported are for single male householders; the corresponding percentages for single females are 15.3% 
for 65-year-olds to 46% for those over 90. The maximum loan amount for couples is lower (14–45%). 
15 From the Deutsche Bank’s informative leaflet for Italian reverse mortgage borrowers. 
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where 
iA  = yearly payment to (household) borrower i 
H  = the value of the house 
r = yearly interest rate (approximated) 
ei = life expectancy at age i, calculated as 100 minus current age 
 
Table 2 describes the results of our calculations for the UCS sample, 
restricted to the over 65. The first column reports estimates of the average 
housing equity by housing quintile, age, household income units, and 
geographical area. The second column shows the maximum loan advance, 
calculated as housing equity16 multiplied by the percentage available to the 
average age group for each subcategory. The third column reports the 
annuity, calculated by applying the sinking fund formula (times 12, since the 
formula refers to a monthly sum). The fourth column shows the estimated 
average income for the categories reported above and the last column 
calculates the RM as a percentage of income. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported by Ong (2008), since those over 75 and single 
females with lower incomes and above average housing equity would benefit 
the most from taking our a RM. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data 
Our analysis draws from a unique source of data, the UCS, carried out in 
2007. The survey targets the bank’s clients aged 21–75 with at least €10,000 
in deposits. The sample is stratified according to geographical area, city size, 
and financial wealth. Additional data were extracted from the Bank of Italy’s 
                                                          
 
16 Average values are reported. 
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2006 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to compare the 
characteristics of UCS respondents with those of a representative sample of 
the entire Italian population (see Table 3).  
As well as collecting detailed demographic and financial data for a sample 
of 1,686 individuals, the survey directly elicits respondents’ interest in RMs. 
The question is asked to the household head, i.e. the person responsible for 
financial decisions, if he or she is a homeowner. A brief description of the 
product was given by the interviewer, and respondents assigned a value 
between 1 and 5 according to their level of interest: 1.1% claimed to be ‘very 
interested’, 6.2% ‘quite interested’, 12.9% ‘somewhat interested’, 20.4% 
‘barely interested’, and 59.4 ‘not interested’. 
The UCS oversamples the wealthy (see Table 4): the average household 
income in the UCS is €71,325 (median €48,393), roughly 2.2 times the 
average SHIW household income of €31,893 (median €26,217). Households 
are categorised according to their wealth bracket, defined by the amount of 
money kept in UniCredit deposits, ranging from €10,000 to €5 million. While 
the average financial wealth in the SHIW amounts to €25,246 (median 
€6,674), with 18% of households reporting no financial wealth at all, the 
average wealth bracket in the UCS is €100,000 to €150,000. The rate of 
homeownership is also substantially higher: approximately 90% of the UCS 
households own their home, versus 71% in the SHIW, and the rates of 
homeownership among the elderly are even higher, 93% in the UCS versus 
78% in the SHIW. As for housing equity, Table 5 shows how the average 
house value in the UCS is 1.8 times that in the SHIW, with a mean value of 
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€376,613 17 . Finally, educational attainment is higher in the UCS: the 
percentage of respondents who have at least an upper secondary certification 
is more than double that for the SHIW 18  (see Table 3). Elderly male 
household heads are on average wealthier both in terms of housing value and 
in terms of household income (Table 7). 
The trade-off between risk and return on investments reveals a majority 
of moderately risk-averse respondents19. Another set of risk-related questions 
investigates the respondents’ risk attitude in a context of gain or loss 
(questions in appendix) 20. Both elderly male and female household heads are 
more risk averse than their younger counterpart in a gain scenario, while 
women under 65 years of age are the most risk loving, particularly in a loss 
scenario. Expectations on future public pensions is ascertained by asking 
respondents how worried they felt about their standard of living after 
retirement, with nearly 40% answering ‘quite worried’ or ‘very worried’. 
Over 85% of respondents consider not having future debts an important 
reason for saving, and over 70.5% are averse to debt. When asked how they 
would finance a hypothetical expenditure of €20,000, more than 60% replied 
they would draw from their savings, 20% would sell their financial assets, and 
about 16% would take out a bank loan. One question was specifically asked 
to assess respondents’ willingness to sell their home as a means of increasing 
future income: the idea that the elderly do not wish to downsize appears to 
                                                          
 
17 The data regarding housing equity had to be cleaned substantially, since a few hundred respondents provided 
implausible numbers (writing 1s, 999s or over a hundred millions); the first decile and the top percentile had to be 
trimmed to yield these values.  
18 However, Banca d'Italia's official 2008 Report on Household Wealth specifies that the sample is affected by 
selection bias, as in the lower participation of wealthier households and under-reporting of income and wealth. 
19 Only 1.8% would rather have high returns and high risks; 27.6% prefer good returns and sufficient safety; 52% 
prefer sufficient returns and good safety, and 18.6% prefer low returns but no risks. 
20 Kahneman and Tversky (1991) define framing as the way in which a choice or an option can be affected by the 
way it is presented to a decision maker, specifically whether it is presented as a gain or as a loss; individuals are 
generally found to be more risk averse if the question is framed as a gain, and more risk loving if framed as a loss. 
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be confirmed by the high proportion answering ‘certainly not’ (53.1%) or 
‘probably not’ (27.0%). 
The respondents’ financial literacy (questions in appendix) was gauged by 
only three of the four questions about inflation, interest rates, and portfolio 
diversification, in order to have an indicator which is more consistent with 
the one used by Lusardi and Mitchell. We did not use the self assessed index 
as it is more an indicator of overconfidence than actual financial knowledge 
(Guiso and Jappelli 2009). Less than 8% of the respondents answered at all 
three questions correctly, with elderly female household heads exhibiting 
overall worse performance (see Table 6). 
A preliminary descriptive analysis shows how the distribution of interest 
in RMs differs according to the previously described variables. Gender and 
marital status do not seem to have an effect (Figure 1), while respondents in 
the lowest quintile of housing wealth appear more interested (Figure 2). Debt 
aversion shifts the distribution of interest towards the left (least interested), 
while negative retirement expectations shift it towards the right (Figure 3 and 
Figure 4); answering all financial literacy tests correctly does not seem to 
affect the distribution of interest in RMs (Figure 5) 
4.2. Econometric specifications 
As we have highlighted already, the UCS oversamples the wealthy, and 
restricts participation to clients with at least 10,000 euros in deposits21. 
Furthermore, only homeowners who answered the RM-related question are 
included in the regression, which might reduce the scope for our estimates. 
                                                          
 
21 We have to assume that interest in RMs and the truncation factor (having more than 10,000 euros in deposits) 
are not correlated.  This may or may not sound plausible, however the results will show that subjective states, 
rather than objective circumstances, appear more significantly correlated with our dependent variable. 
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The reason we are using the UCS rather than the more representative SHIW 
is that, to our knowledge, it is the only survey in Italy that includes a specific 
question on RMs. Bearing in mind such limitations, we can further our 
analysis and investigate the determinant of interest in RMs. 
The respondent’s interest in RMs is measured on an ordinal scale, and the 
levels of interest are represented by a discrete variable that can take one of 
the following five values: 
yi = 1 if the respondent is not interested 
yi = 2 if the respondent is barely interested 
yi = 3 if the respondent is somewhat interested 
yi = 4 if the respondent is quite interested 
yi = 5 if the respondent is very interested 
We assume that the discrete values are based on an underlying continuous 
and latent variable y* and that this latent variable is a linear function of all 
the explanatory variables: 
yi* = β’x +ε  for I = 1, 2, …, N 
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, x is a vector of covariates 
that are assumed to be strictly independent of , N is the number of 
respondents, and  is the error term, which we assume to be normally 
distributed. 
Let µ1< µ2 < µ3 < µ4 be the unknown thresholds parameters or cut-off points. 
Then we observe 
yi = 1 if yi*≤ µ1 
yi = 2 if µ1 <yi*≤ µ2 
yi = 3 if µ2 <yi*≤ µ3 
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yi = 4 if µ3 <yi*≤ µ4 
yi = 5 if yi*> µ4 
The threshold parameters are estimated together with the β values to help 
match the probabilities associated with each discrete outcome.  
The probabilities of yi being classified as not interested, barely interested, 
somewhat interested, quite interested, and very interested, respectively, are 
given by 
 
Prob(yi = 1) = Prob(β’x + ε ≤ µ1) 
Prob(yi = 2) = Prob(µ1 < β’x + ε ≤ µ2) 
Prob(yi = 3) = Prob(µ2 < β’x + ε ≤ µ3) 
Prob(yi = 4) = Prob(µ3 < β’x + ε ≤ µ4) 
Prob(yi = 5) = Prob(β’x + ε > µ4) 
Both the cutoff points and β coefficients can be estimated as an ordered 
probit model by the maximum likelihood method (Greene 2003; Train 2003). 
Estimating the β values is not enough, since they do not reflect marginal 
changes in probability; therefore we calculate the marginal effects (at the 
mean value) to interpret results more clearly. 
The vector of covariates x includes the following: age categories for the 
household head, the log of the household income, the log of average housing 
wealth per square metre by region and city size, a financial literacy index, a 
risk aversion index, and several dichotomous variables to control for 
heterogeneity (single/divorced, widower, female, retired, university graduate, 
household with or without children, negative retirement expectations, debt 
aversion, and willingness to sell the house). 
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4.3. Estimation results 
A rich set of sociodemographic factors, personal characteristics, and 
preferences has been used to capture respondents’ attitudes in the ordered 
probit regression.  
A first-order probit was carried out using only demographic and 
socioeconomic variables as controls (see Table 8). Most age categories are not 
significant, except for the over 70s who, despite being the main potential 
beneficiaries, are less likely to be interested in RMs. Gender, and higher 
education are not significant; being single or divorced is significantly 
correlated with a higher level of interest; household income is not significant. 
Since housing wealth is potentially endogenous, we use the average housing 
equity per square metre by region and city size and observe that it is 
significantly and negatively correlated with interest in RMs. The bequest 
motive, proxied by having children in the household22, does not appear to 
predict a lower level of interest, as it is positively, albeit not significantly, 
correlated with interest in the product. A possible explanation is that RMs 
can be used to increase not only one’s own consumption, but also his or her 
children’s.  
We carry out a second ordered probit regression adding respondents’ 
attitudes as controls and find that they have higher predictive power (see 
Table 9), while demographics lose significance; in particular, risk aversion, 
perceiving the house as a risky investment and having negative expectations 
about future pension income are correlated with a significantly higher level of 
interest.  
                                                          
 
22 As a robustness check we also controlled for reporting bequest as a reason for saving, and the results are not 
significant. 
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We find evidence contrasting the suggestion that the desire to move from 
one’s current home is a deterrent to entering the RM market (Kutty 1999; 
Caplin 2001. On the contrary, interest in RM is highly and positively 
correlated with the willingness to sell one’s house, indicated by a binary 
variable equal to one if respondents claimed to be ‘certainly’ or ‘quite 
probably’ willing to liquidate their house (as a means of increasing income), 
or equal to zero if respondents were ‘certainly not’ or ‘probably not’ 
interested in liquidating their home.  
The effect of risk aversion is estimated through an index taking on values 
from 0.1 to 1 (low to high risk aversion), 23 the coefficient is positive and 
significant. The perception of risks specifically related to housing investment 
is captured by a binary variable awarding one point to homeowners who 
perceive housing investment as quite risky or very risky, and zero otherwise. 
As the binary variable takes the value of 1, the probability that y=1 (“not 
interested”) decreases by 8.9%. Uncertainty about post-retirement income is 
gauged by a binary variable awarding one point to respondents who claimed 
to be very worried or quite worried about their economic welfare in old age, 
and zero otherwise. Being worried about the future is associated with a 
significantly higher interest in RMs, since the probability that y=1 decreases 
by 7.2 percentage points. 
Among the predictors of lower interest, reluctance to borrow (debt 
aversion) and higher average housing equity are particularly significant. As 
financial literacy increases, so does the probability of not being interested in 
the product. We checked whether different indicators of financial literacy, for 
                                                          
 
23 A score of one was assigned to every positive answer to the question on risk in a gain scenario. All the answers 
were then summed and divided by 10 to obtain a risk loving index ranging from 0.1 to one; this was then reversed 
to obtain an index of risk aversion. 
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instance the one used in Guiso and Jappelli (2009)24, might yield different 
results, but the coefficient remains negative, even though the significance is 
slightly lower.  
Further checks are carried out by selecting an older sample of 
respondents. If we restrict the sample size to the over 50, leaving us with a 
total of 747 observations, the main results do not change (table not reported, 
but available on request): uncertainty about post-retirement standard of 
living and the perception of housing investment as risky are the only 
significant predictors of interest; debt aversion is the most significant 
predictor of lack of interest, while all other variables are not significant. 
Moreover, splitting the sample into those who are willing and unwilling to 
sell their house (table not reported, but available on request) reveals that, 
among respondents who are more attached to their homes, being a pensioner 
and having negative post-retirement expectations are significant predictors of 
interest in the product. Note that the sample size is extremely reduced, as 
the percentage of household heads willing to sell their house is not very high.  
Our results shed important light on the potential demand for RM: it 
would appear as though the product is not yet understood as a way to 
achieve consumption smoothing after retirement, but rather as an option in 
case of necessity. People with higher housing equity and the elderly appear 
less interested in this kind of products, even though they would receive a 
larger annuity. This evidence suggests that making some counselling for the 
elderly compulsory, for instance requiring attendance to financial literacy 
courses (in which people are exposed to the basic concept of asset 
                                                          
 
24 The indicator of financial literacy built by Guiso and Jappelli considers not only the 3 financial literacy tests that 
we used, but also a fourth one relative to portfolio diversification and the risk assessment relative to different types 
of financial assets and housing.  
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decumulation and the way of accomplish it), would generate higher welfare 
by informing people about their consumption possibilities.  
5. Conclusions 
Understanding the prospective role of RMs is important for both micro and 
macroeconomic reasons: it can increase income security in old age and allow 
better consumption smoothing, as well as alleviate the burden of an ageing 
population on public budgets. This paper contributes to the task by focusing 
on the Italian potential market.  
Since approximately 70% of the Italian households are homeowners, with 
housing wealth representing over 80% 25 of their assets, the availability of 
home equity release instruments is an important determinant of the timing 
and dimension of wealth depletion with old age. We estimate household head 
characteristics most significantly correlated with a given level of interest: 
being single or divorced and resident in the north of Italy, predict a higher 
level of interest, while being over 70 has the opposite effect. Household 
income is not significant. Housing equity is negatively correlated with interest 
in the product. Debt aversion lowers the probability of being interested in the 
product, while having negative post-retirement expectations predicts higher 
interest. The bequest motive does not emerge as a hindrance to the uptake of 
the product. 
Three main findings emerge from our analysis: first, homeowners who are 
prepared to sell their home are more likely to be interested in the product, 
considered as an alternative to downsizing. Second, respondents perceive 
RMs as debt (even though the burden of repaying the loan lies with their 
                                                          
 
25 Median values.  
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heirs), and debt aversion predicts low interest. Third, homeowners who are 
more concerned about their standard of living after retirement are also more 
likely to be interested in RMs, which is consistent with both the cuts and the 
greater uncertainty Italian households had to endure following recent pension 
reforms.  
We also find that RMs do not seem to be well understood products as the 
major potential beneficiaries appear less likely to be interested. Rather than 
being considered as an instrument to accomplish consumption smoothing, it 
is perceived as a last resort in case of poverty. This evidence strongly 
encourages the realisation of a well structured financial education program, 
particularly targeted to low income elderly. From a policy standpoint, the 
need to provide financial counselling to the elderly in order to make them 
aware of their consumption possibilities becomes a priority.   
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Appendix. Survey questions used to construct the control variables 
Risk aversion 
Gain – Imagine you are in a room from which you can exit through two doors: If you choose the 
correct one, you win €10,000; if you choose the wrong one, you win nothing. Of course, you don’t know 
where the prize is. You can also choose a back door and withdraw a fixed amount. Answer: Yes/no. 
− If I offered €100, would you give up choosing between the two doors and settle for the back door? 
(Continue to the next question if no.) And if I offered €500? And if I offered €1,500? […] And if I 
offered €9,000? 
Loss – Imagine now a more difficult situation. You can still exit the room through two doors, however 
if you choose the correct one, you win nothing, but if you choose the wrong one, you lose €10,000. You 
may also choose a third door and lose a fixed amount.  
− Would you pay €9,000 to exit through the backdoor? (Continue to the next if she says No) 
Debt aversion 
What is your opinion about borrowing? (select one answer) 
a) I have no qualms/impediments to using loans should I need to (10.5%); b) I am willing to resort 
only to limited borrowing, since I would rather not encumber my future with excessive burdens 
(18.9%); c) I would rather not have debts (70.6%). 
 
Financial literacy: The respondent is awarded one point for answering correctly. 
Inflation – money illusion. 
Suppose a bank account yields a 2% interest per annum (after expenses and taxes). If actual inflation is 
2% per year (assuming you did not access your account) after two years, the amount deposited can buy 
you (select one answer): 
a) More than it can buy today; b) less than it can buy today; c) the same as it can buy today 
(correct); and d) cannot answer/cannot understand. 
Interest rates 
Imagine having a ‘tip’ and knowing for certain that in six months interest rates will rise. Do you think 
it is appropriate to purchase fixed rate bonds today? 
a) Yes; b) no (correct); c) I do not know. 
Diversification  
In relation to investments, people often talk about diversification. In your opinion, to have proper 
diversification of one’s investments means (select one response): 
a) To have in one’s investment portfolio bonds and shares; b) not to invest for too long in the same 
financial product; c) to invest in the greatest possible number of financial products; d) to invest 
simultaneously in multiple financial products to limit exposure to the risks associated with individual 
products (correct); e) to not invest in high-risk instruments; f) I do not know/cannot understand. 
Post-retirement expectations – select one answer 
How worried are you about your economic well-being in old age/after you retire? 
1. Not worried; 2. barely worried; 3. quite worried; 4. very worried. 
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Figure 1: Interest in RMs – Age category and Gender 
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Source: UCS 
Figure 2: Interest in RMs – By Housing Quintiles 
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Source: UCS 
Figure 3: Interest in RMs – By Gender and Debt Aversion 
0
20
40
60
0
20
40
60
No
t in
ter
es
ted
Ba
re
ly 
inte
re
ste
d
So
m
ew
ha
t In
ter
es
ted
Qu
ite
 
int
er
es
ted
Ve
ry 
int
er
es
ted
  
No
t in
ter
es
ted
Ba
re
ly i
nte
re
ste
d
So
m
ew
ha
t In
ter
es
ted
Qu
ite
 
int
er
es
ted
Ve
ry 
int
er
es
ted
  
Male, Not averse to debt Male, Averse to debt
Female, Not averse to debt Female, Averse to debt
Pe
rc
e
nt
Interest in Reverse Mortgage
 
Source: UCS 
  26  
Figure 4: Interest in RMs – By Gender and Retirement Expectations 
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Figure 5: Interest in RMs – By Gender and Financial Literacy 
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Table 1: Summary statistics  
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Age groups    
41 to 50 = 1 if age>40 0.21 0.41 
51 to 60 = 1 if 51>age>= 60 0.26 0.44 
61 to 70 = 1 if 61>age>= 70 0.31 0.46 
Over 70 = 1 if age>70 0.10 0.30 
Single or divorced = 1 if household head is single or divorced 0.21 0.40 
Widower = 1 if household head is widower (male) 0.08 0.27 
Female = 1 if household head is Female 0.22 0.41 
High education (d) = 1 if household head has at least a degree 0.65 0.48 
Households with children (d) = 1 if there are children in the household 0.49 0.50 
Householder pensioner (d) = 1 if household head is a pensioner 0.35 0.48 
Log Household Income = natural logarithm of Household income 10.77 0.58 
Log of housing value = natural logarithm of housing value 7.92 0.35 
Financial Literacy = index of Financial literacy, from 0 to 3 1.26 0.86 
Risk attitude = index of risk attitude from 0.1 to 1 0.59 0.30 
Housing risk = 1 if housing assets perceived as risky 0.10 0.30 
Willingness to sell the house = 1 if household head would sell the house as a mean to increase 
consumption in old age 
0.20 0.40 
Debt averse = 1 if household head prefers not to have any debt 0.71 0.46 
Negative retirement 
expectations 
= 1 if household head is worried about future income after retirement 0.38 0.49 
Source: UCS 
Table 2: Estimating the monetary value of RMs  
  Average  
housing  
equity 
Maximum 
loan  
advance 
RM  
annuity 
Average 
household  
income  
Percentage 
gain in income 
from RM 
All  376,613 112,984 3,870 54,547 7% 
Housing equity quintile      
I quintile  114,463 28,616 1,176 41,416 3% 
II quintile  199,098 49,775 2,046 44,533 5% 
III quintile  279,277 69,819 2,870 47,298 6% 
IV quintile  395,139 98,785 4,060 62,461 6% 
V quintile  774,065 193,516 7,953 70,997 11% 
 Age Category       
 65–69 years  414,130 93,179 4,255 55,948 8% 
 70–74 years  422,360 137,267 6,986 53,219 13% 
 75–80 years  339,500 127,313 8,680 42,738 20% 
 80 years or over  433,333 173,333 11,080 44,180 25% 
 Household Income Unit       
 Couple  420,668 105,167 4,322 58,848 7% 
 Single male  330,083 82,521 3,392 53,618 6% 
 Single female  362,876 90,719 3,728 45,025 8% 
 Geographical Area       
 North   394,763 98,691 4,056 53,657 8% 
 Centre  445,478 111,370 4,577 56,260 8% 
 South  432,618 108,154 4,445 55,099 8% 
Source: UCS.  
Note: sample is restricted to the over 65.  
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Table 3: Comparing UCS and SHIW  
 UCS   SHIW  
Age of household head 56.0  57.6 
Female household heads 22.0%  37.0% 
Elderly household heads 29.6%  36.3% 
Higher education (degree or more) 24.4%  8.9% 
Pensioners 32.3%  36.1% 
Self-employed 29.4%  10.2% 
Homeowners 90.3%  71.2% 
Average household income €71,325  €31,893 
Average housing equity €376,613  €235,294 
# of observations 1,686  7,768 
Source: UCS and SHIW 
(a)
 Unfinished years of education are added to the level attained immediately before. 
(b)
 Includes housewives and the voluntarily unemployed. 
Table 4: Summary statistics by income level and distribution  
Percentile UniCredit  SHIW  
 
In € 
Household net 
disposable income 
Individual net 
disposable income 
 Household net 
disposable income 
Individual net 
disposable income 
      
5th 17,934 9,500 9,078 3,767 
10th 22,000 13,883 11,968 5,562 
25th 31,733 20,000 17,169 10,000 
50th 48,393 31,000 26,217 15,349 
75th 76,655 55,000 39,766 22,487 
90th 129,600 100,000 55,823 32,000 
95th 195,827 150,239 69,275 41,294 
Mean 71,325 50,717 31,893 18,450 
Standard deviation 86,024 67,847 27,276 18,578 
# of observations 1,686 1,686 7,768 13,428 
Source: UCS and SHIW 
Table 5: Summary statistics by housing wealth level and distribution 
Percentile UniCredit  SHIW  
 
In € 
Household housing 
wealth 
Housing wealth per 
square metre 
 Household housing 
wealth 
Housing wealth per 
square metre 
      
5th 100,000 1,000.0  50,000 666.7 
10th 140,000 1,307.7  80,000 892.9 
25th 200,000 1,829.3  125,000 1,307.7 
50th 300,000 2,500.0  200,000 1,875.0 
75th 450,000 3,571.4  300,000 2,560.0 
90th 700,000 5,000.0  400,000 3,529.4 
95th 900,000 6,315.8  500,000 4,285.7 
Mean 376,613 2,932.1  235,294 2,095.9 
Standard deviation 313,963 1,753.4  201,493 1,196.1 
# of observations 1,324 1,323  5,474 13,428 
Source: UCS and SHIW 
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Table 6: Financial literacy 
Under 65  Over 65   Financial Literacy 
(% of correct answers) Male Female  Male Female   All 
No correct answers 18.8 21.8  21.8 23.8  20.2 
1 correct answer 39.3 43.6  39.1 53.3  40.8 
2 correct answers 33.1 29.3  32.0 21.0  31.2 
3 correct answers 8.8 5.3  7.1 1.9  7.4 
# of observations 921 266  394 105  1,686 
Source: UCS 
Table 7: Distribution of housing wealth and household income by gender and 
age group 
 Average Housing value  Average Household Income 
 Male Female  Male Female 
Under 40 306,674 384,546  56,711 68,227 
41 to 50 368,211 300,846  75,243 61,266 
51 to 60 364,785 333,781  80,040 60,388 
61 to 70 424,006 390,121  84,452 47,532 
Over 70 438,963 361,786  63,717 44,142 
Source: UCS 
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Table 8: Ordered probit regression, controlling for demographics only 
   Marginal Effects on Probabilities 
Interested in RMs Coeff.  Y=1 
 (No) 
Y=2 
(Barely) 
Y=3 
(Somewhat) 
Y=4  
(Quite) 
Y=5  
(Very) 
 b/se  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Age groups        
41 to 50 -0.129  0.049 -0.015 -0.018 -0.013 -0.003 
 (-0.12)  (-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
51 to 60 -0.184  0.071 -0.021 -0.026 -0.018 -0.005 
 (-0.12)  (-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
61 to 70 -0.208  0.08 -0.024 -0.03 -0.021 -0.006 
 (-0.14)  (-0.05) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Over 71 -0.393**  0.145** -0.050** -0.053** -0.034*** -0.008*** 
 (-0.17)  (-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Single or divorced (d) 0.233**  -0.092** 0.023*** 0.034** 0.027** 0.008* 
 (-0.10)  (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Widower (d) 0.116  -0.045 0.012 0.017 0.013 0.004 
 (-0.14)  (-0.06) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) 
Female (d) -0.007  0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 
 (-0.09)  (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
High education (d) -0.057  0.022 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 
 (-0.08)  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Households with children (d) 0.048  -0.019 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.001 
 (-0.08)  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Householder pensioner (d) -0.012  0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0 
 (-0.10)  (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Log Household Income 0.072  -0.028 0.008 0.01 0.008 0.002 
 (-0.07)  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Log of Avg. Housing Value 
(by region and city size)  
-0.229**  0.089** -0.025** -0.033** -0.024** -0.007** 
 (-0.10)  (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Number of observations 1,157       
Log likelihood -1,313.58       
Pseudo R2 0.009       
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively.  
(a)
 Standard errors in parentheses.   
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Table 9: Ordered probit regression, controlling for demographics and attitudes 
   Marginal Effects on Probabilities 
Interested in RMs Coeff.  Y=1 
 (No) 
Y=2 
(Barely) 
Y=3 
(Somewhat) 
Y=4  
(Quite) 
Y=5  
(Very) 
 b/se  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Age groups        
41 to 50 -0.131  0.050 -0.016 -0.020 -0.012 -0.002 
 (-0.12)  (-0.05) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
51 to 60 -0.130  0.050 -0.016 -0.020 -0.012 -0.002 
 (-0.12)  (-0.05) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
61 to 70 -0.089  0.035 -0.011 -0.014 -0.008 -0.002 
 (-0.14)  (-0.05) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Over 71 -0.285  0.107* -0.037 -0.042* -0.023* -0.004* 
 (-0.18)  (-0.06) (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Single or divorced (d) 0.183*  -0.072* 0.020* 0.029* 0.019 0.004 
 (-0.10)  (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Widower (d) 0.020  -0.008 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 
 (-0.15)  (-0.06) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Female (d) 0.057  -0.022 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.001 
 (-0.10)  (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
High education (d) -0.008  0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (-0.08)  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
HH with children (d) 0.110  -0.043 0.013 0.017 0.011 0.002 
 (-0.08)  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Householder pensioner (d) 0.017  -0.007 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 
 (-0.10)  (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Log Household Income 0.025  -0.010 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.000 
 (-0.07)  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Log of Avg. Housing Value 
(by region and city size) -0.240**  0.093** -0.028** -0.037** -0.023** -0.005** 
 (-0.10)  (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Financial Literacy -0.077*  0.030* -0.009* -0.012* -0.007* -0.002* 
 (-0.04)  (-0.02) (0.00) (-0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk aversion 0.211*  -0.082* 0.025* 0.033* 0.020* 0.004 
 (-0.12)  (-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Housing risk 0.226*  -0.089* 0.023** 0.036* 0.025* 0.006 
 (-0.12)  (-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Willing to sell the house 0.663***  -0.259*** 0.051*** 0.103*** 0.083*** 0.023*** 
 (-0.09)  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
Debt Averse  -0.372***  0.146*** -0.039*** -0.058*** -0.040*** -0.009*** 
 (-0.08)  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Negative retirement 
expectations 
0.184**  -0.072** 0.021** 0.029** 0.018** 0.004** 
 (-0.07)  (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) 
Number of # of obs. 1,157       
Log likelihood -1,240.85       
Pseudo R2    0.05       
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively.  
(a)
 Standard errors in parentheses.   
